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This Briefing summarises ICTD Working 
Paper 55, which examines the Mutual 
Agreement Procedure (MAP) for tax 
authorities to resolve their differences over 
the interpretation of tax treaties. It surveys 
available evidence on reasons for the 
increase in such conflicts, and analyses 
proposals for improving the MAP, especially 
mandatory binding arbitration. Despite the 
shift to arbitration in the past decade among 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) states, there 
has been a continued rise in conflicts and 
in the time taken to resolve them. It seems 
inappropriate, especially for developing 
countries, to deal with these important 
issues through international procedures 
cloaked in total secrecy. A better approach 
would be to aim to minimise conflicts by 
developing clear and simple rules for 
apportioning the income of integrated 
transnational corporations (TNCs), and 
agreeing interpretations of tax treaty 
provisions that can be made public. Greater 
transparency is the best way to provide 
the clarity and predictability that business 
needs, and to reassure the public that 
decisions on international taxation are fair.
Enforcing tax treaties
Tax treaties allocate rights to tax between 
states, but their provisions also generally 
apply automatically in national law. 
This gives directly enforceable rights to 
taxpayers – mainly TNCs – to bring actions 
in national courts against any tax measure 
that may be contrary to a treaty. Treaties 
also generally include a procedure for a 
taxpayer to complain to the competent 
authority in the tax administration against 
a tax measure that may be contrary to the 
treaty. If the competent authority considers 
the complaint admissible it may resolve 
the issue itself, but otherwise must consult 
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with the competent authority of the other treaty 
partner. 
Thus, not only can taxpayers directly enforce 
tax treaty provisions that benefit them, which is 
unusual in international law, but they can also 
take advantage of two parallel procedures – one 
legal and one administrative.
Under the tax treaty’s MAP, the two competent 
authorities must endeavour to eliminate any 
taxation not in accordance with the treaty – but 
they are not obliged to do so. The MAP is an 
administrative procedure, conducted in total 
secrecy, and even the existence of a claim is 
not made public – so it tends to be preferred 
by corporate tax advisers to court cases, which 
generally are public. However, TNCs frequently 
complain that the MAP takes too long, and does 
not guarantee an outcome. The solution they 
have long pressed for is to oblige authorities to 
refer unresolved disputes to binding third party 
arbitration. 
The BEPS project and 
dispute resolution
This was regarded as a key issue during 
consultations on the G20/OECD project on base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), especially by 
tax advisers for TNCs. The BEPS project’s main 
proposals would strengthen the power of tax 
authorities to combat the tax avoidance techniques 
that have become increasingly prevalent 
among TNCs. Although these measures will be 
coordinated to some extent, their implementation in 
national law and by national officials will inevitably 
leave much scope for divergent interpretations.
The risk of such divergence is especially high 
since many of these provisions are complex, 
and fail to provide clear rules – especially for 
the allocation of profits between the different 
affiliates of a TNC. In particular, the rules on 
transfer pricing allow a range of methods, and 
require tax officials to analyse each TNC’s 
business model and to identify the functions 
performed, assets deployed and risks assumed 
by the TNC’s various component subsidiaries 
and branches. This requires specialist knowledge 
of a wide range of business sectors, and involves 
discretionary and subjective judgements. 
Hence, there is justifiable concern about the 
likely increase in conflicts due to inconsistent 
evaluations by different tax authorities. 
Consequently, the BEPS outputs also provide 
measures to strengthen dispute resolution. They 
aim to put pressure on states to ensure that all 
conflicts are resolved within a strict timetable. 
Some states have also committed to accepting 
mandatory binding arbitration, and there may 
be pressure on others to do so. However, the 
procedures will remain totally secret.
Dealing with divergence
Divergent interpretations may result either in 
double taxation or in double non-taxation – that 
is, tax avoidance. Exploiting loopholes due to 
such divergence is central to the techniques 
developed by tax advisers to reduce TNC tax 
payments. One way to block such loopholes is for 
tax authorities to harmonise their interpretations 
through the MAP – unfortunately it has rarely 
been used for this purpose. The MAP is almost 
always initiated by a taxpayer, usually a TNC, 
complaining about possible double taxation.
Due to the secrecy that surrounds these conflicts, 
there is little hard information about their nature 
or causes. However, data on the number of MAP 
cases has been collected and published for the 
past ten years by the OECD, and more recently by 
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TNCs frequently 
complain that the MAP takes 
too long, and does not 
guarantee an outcome.
the European Commission (see the Appendices 
of the research paper). The OECD data reveals 
both a significant growth in cases initiated, 
and a sharper rise in pending cases each year 
(Figure 1). Even before the BEPS project, OECD 
countries experienced a continuing increase in 
conflicting interpretations of tax treaties, and a 
larger rise in the time taken to resolve them.
Figure 1 Growth of MAP cases 
between OECD countries
Indirect evidence suggests that a large majority 
of conflicts deal with allocation of profits of TNCs 
(transfer pricing). 
The bulk of MAP cases have occurred among 
the main OECD countries, and so far little use 
has been made of the procedure in developing 
countries. A significant exception is India, which 
introduced transfer pricing regulations based on 
the OECD Guidelines in 2001. Their enforcement 
led to a rapid rise in cases, and by 2012 there 
was an estimated backlog of over 3,000 cases 
in the tax tribunals. It is not possible to compare 
the number of court cases with MAP complaints, 
as India does not publish this data. However, a 
conflict about the backlog of MAP cases between 
the US and Indian competent authorities 
became public, leading to the replacement 
of the Indian official in July 2013. In January 
2015 a press release announced that they had 
signed a Framework Agreement under the MAP 
procedure, which aimed to facilitate resolution of 
some 200 conflicts; a year later it was reported 
that about half had been resolved, though no 
details are public.
In contrast, Brazil, which applies a system of 
fixed margins for transfer pricing considered 
unorthodox by the OECD, has experienced 
relatively little litigation, and few or no MAP 
claims. China has seen an increase to 55 MAP 
cases in 2014, according to data reported to 
the OECD. Most developing countries have 
no formal arrangements in place for the MAP. 
However, cases are beginning to emerge – for 
example, it is known that two MAP claims 
have been made in the Netherlands and in 
South Africa as a result of tax assessments 
by the Uganda Revenue Authority involving 
telecommunications companies. 
Such claims may increase further, especially 
if countries adopt interpretations that could be 
considered unorthodox. 
The introduction of 
arbitration
The growth in cases among OECD countries has 
continued, despite reforms they have introduced 
to the MAP in the past decade – including a shift 
to arbitration. 
An arbitration procedure has been in place 
between EU states for transfer pricing cases since 
1995. Under the EU Arbitration Convention, if such 
a conflict has not been resolved within two years 
it must be referred to a Commission consisting 
of an even number of independent experts, as 
well as representatives of each tax authority. The 
Commission must produce a reasoned opinion: 
the decision can only be published by agreement 
of the parties, and this has never occurred. The 
competent authorities must then resolve the 
conflict within six months, either by accepting the 
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decision or agreeing an alternative solution. In 
practice, it seems less than half a dozen cases 
have been referred to a Commission.
Ten years ago, the US introduced a different 
form of arbitration in its treaties with Canada and 
Germany, also for disputes unresolved within two 
years. This ‘baseball’ or ‘short-form’ arbitration 
requires the arbitrators not to give their own 
independent opinion, but to choose between 
the last best offers tabled by the state parties. 
The decisions are also prohibited from being 
published, or being used as precedents in later 
cases. Informed commentators suggest that ten 
or a dozen arbitrations have taken place in the 
nine years since the procedures have been in 
effect, mostly between the US and Canada, and 
that so far the US has won all of them.
Arbitration provisions have been included in the 
OECD model convention (2007) and that of the 
United Nations (2011, as an alternative). Various 
versions of these have been included in over 200 
actual treaties, including some with developing 
countries (Table 1). A key issue is who has 
the right to trigger arbitration: four of these 
developing country treaties give the taxpayer this 
right, in line with the OECD model; the others 
require either one or both competent authorities 
to agree to refer. 
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South Africa Canada 1995 Both states N N Y NA Y N
Egypt Netherlands 1999 Either state Y N Y 5 Y N
Uganda Italy 2000 Both states Y N N NA N Y
Congo Italy 2003 Both states Y N N NA N Y
Uganda Netherlands 2004 Either state Y N Y 2 Y N
Ghana Italy 2004 Both states Y N Y NA Y N
South Africa Netherlands 2005 Either state Y N Y 2 Y N
South Africa Switzerland 2007 Either state Y N Y 3 Y N
OECD model 2007 Taxpayer Y Y Y 2 Y N
Ghana Netherlands 2008 Either state N Y Y 2 Y N
Namibia Canada 2010* Both states Y Y Y NA Y N
UN model 2011 Either state N Y N 3 Y N
Ethiopia Netherlands 2012 Taxpayer Y N Y 2 Y N
Malawi Netherlands 2015* Taxpayer Y Y Y 3 Y N
Kenya Netherlands 2015* Taxpayer Y N Y 2 Y N
Rwanda Jersey 2015** Either state N Y N 3 Y N
Algeria UK 2015* Taxpayer Y Y Y 2 Y N
Zambia Netherlands 2015 Either state N N N 2 N N
*OECD type clause   **UN type clause
Source: Hearson (2015) The tax treaty arbitrators cometh, https://martinhearson.wordpress.com/2015/09/21/the-tax-treaty-arbitrators-cometh
Table 1 Tax treaties with developing countries containing arbitration provisions
The tiny number of cases actually sent to 
arbitration shows that its main effect is to put 
pressure on the competent authorities to resolve 
cases. Yet there has been a continued rise in the 
time they take. The main success in reducing 
a large backlog quickly seems to have resulted 
from the Framework Agreement between the US 
and India. 
The MAP and national 
sovereignty
Developing countries have generally opposed 
arbitration, often citing concern about national 
sovereignty. This is not just an abstract issue. 
Tax treaties allocate rights to tax, and leave it 
to each state to decide how to exercise those 
rights. Since treaties generally have direct effect 
in law, each country’s courts must apply their 
provisions; tax authorities are also subject to the 
law as interpreted by the courts. It is contrary to 
principles of the rule of law to give administrative 
authorities wide discretion in applying rules, 
especially if their decisions are subject to 
confidentiality and have little or no accountability. 
Hence, the MAP as an administrative procedure 
can be said to lack legitimacy if it usurps the role 
of the courts. 
Arbitration goes further, and entails accepting 
a supranational decision as binding. It can 
easily be understood why this is difficult for both 
governments and wider public opinion to accept. 
This is especially so as the procedure operates 
in total secret, and deals with matters that have 
aroused widespread concern, often involving 
hundreds of millions of dollars of government 
revenue.
The MAP and transfer 
pricing
The MAP was designed as an amicable 
procedure for administrative authorities to try, 
if possible, to coordinate their interpretation 
of tax treaties. Some divergence is inevitable, 
especially as regards the allocation of the 
income of TNCs or transfer pricing. Under 
the current dominant approach, TNCs are not 
treated as single firms: each country taxes 
the parts of the TNC within its jurisdiction, 
although it has the power to adjust the accounts 
of associated enterprises. Both tax advisers 
and the OECD have continued to insist that 
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Tax issues in trade or investment 
arbitration
Aside from the MAP, a number of tax-related 
disputes have been referred to arbitration under 
international investment or trade agreements, 
which allow investors to bring complaints against 
unfair or discriminatory treatment of any kind. 
On this basis, a number of arbitrations have 
been initiated under such treaties relating to tax 
matters, including claims by Heritage Oil against 
Uganda, and both Vodafone and Cairns Energy 
against India. Some such treaties now have 
filters to try to exclude tax treaty interpretation 
issues from such arbitration. The experience of 
arbitration or adjudication in these related fields 
may have suggested to some that a similar 
procedure could also be suitable for tax. 
However, investment arbitration has 
been described as being in crisis, and 
developing countries in particular have 
moved to denounce or renegotiate treaties 
with arbitration provisions. Criticisms have 
concerned the undemocratic nature of 
giving TNCs the right to challenge national 
regulation through a private international 
arbitration. They have also focused especially 
on the illegitimacy of arbitrators chosen ad 
hoc, sometimes having conflicts of interest, 
adjudicating on public policy issues affecting 
substantial public revenue, often under a cloak 
of secrecy. International tax arbitration is even 
less formalised and much more opaque, so is 
vulnerable to the same criticisms.
international tax rules must treat the affiliates 
within a TNC group as if they were independent 
entities dealing with each other at arm’s length. 
Divergence on how to treat different affiliates 
may mean that the group as a whole is taxed 
on more than 100 per cent of its consolidated 
profits, but this constitutes economic and not 
juridical double taxation. 
Since the methods for adjusting their accounts 
are based on subjective and discretionary 
judgements, it is not surprising that the number 
of these disputes has grown steadily – especially 
in the past decade as countries have applied 
these rules more rigorously. If countries could 
agree on a unitary approach to TNC taxation, 
based on clear criteria for allocating their total 
profits, there would be fewer conflicts and 
any disputes would be easier to resolve by 
transparent and principled decisions.
Effects of the reform 
proposals
The problems with the MAP are symptoms of a 
deeper malaise in the international tax system. 
Improvements may ameliorate some of the 
symptoms, but will worsen the disease. The lack 
of clear criteria for defining and allocating the tax 
base of TNCs has resulted not only in the growth 
of conflicts between tax authorities, but also a 
lack of public confidence in the legitimacy of the 
system. 
The measures proposed in the BEPS report for 
reforming the MAP are aimed at solidifying the 
distinct international tax expert community. They 
call for the competent authority’s officials who 
deal with the MAP to be separated from front-
line tax examination staff, to encourage them 
to give autonomous decisions. The pressure 
to resolve cases quickly and by agreement will 
be increased, especially in countries accepting 
binding arbitration. Monitoring of the system 
through peer review aims to further strengthen 
acculturation to the norms of the specialist 
expert community. Yet the stress on the need 
for independence of the competent authority 
ignores concerns about the frequent rotation 
of roles between public officials and private tax 
advisers. 
This will also place increasing strain on tax 
authorities that are already significantly under-
resourced. International tax, and especially 
transfer pricing, demands highly trained 
staff who are scarce in any tax authority, but 
especially in developing countries. It is hard 
to justify the cost effectiveness of creating a 
separate competent authority with the skills to 
review their decisions. 
International tax arbitration as currently 
practised does not aim to provide decisions 
based on reasoned application of principles 
that are published to ensure that like cases 
can be seen to be treated alike. Arbitrators 
will inevitably be drawn almost entirely from 
the members of the same club of specialists, 
dominated by developed countries, who 
have generally worked as both government 
officials and tax advisers. There must also be 
concern that the intention is to delegitimise 
methodologies and interpretations of tax 
norms that are regarded as unorthodox 
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If countries could 
agree on a unitary 
approach to TNC taxation, 
there would be fewer 
conflicts and any disputes 
would be easier to resolve 
by transparent and 
principled decisions.
or unacceptable to those dominant in the 
international tax community. Cloaking the 
procedures in secrecy inevitably feeds 
suspicions that the intention is to exclude 
alternative approaches. 
A better way forward
The primary aim should be to minimise conflicts 
by making international tax rules clearer and 
easier to apply. Greater use should be made of 
the MAP to reach agreed interpretations that 
can be published. The Framework Agreement 
between India and the US seems to have 
been successful, but would have had a greater 
impact if it had been published. Interpretive 
mutual agreements should include issues 
of double non-taxation, as well as possible 
double taxation. This is especially important 
in the current period of fluidity and change in 
international tax rules. 
This applies in particular to transfer pricing 
rules – these seem to be the main source of 
disputes referred to the MAP, and the most 
intractable cases. Publication of the outcomes 
of MAP cases would help ensure that like cases 
are treated alike, provide guidance for other 
taxpayers, and help reassure public opinion that 
the system is working fairly. Reforms should 
aim to allocate the profits of TNC groups based 
on clear and quantifiable factors that reflect the 
actual economic activities and value created in 
each country. This would not only reduce the 
number of conflicts, but also ensure that the 
disputes that do occur can be adjudicated in a 
transparent, fair and consistent manner.
Publication of the 
outcomes of MAP cases 
would help ensure that like 
cases are treated alike, 
provide guidance for other 
taxpayers, and help 
reassure public opinion 
that the system is working 
fairly.
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